Test matches will disappear from cricket by the year 2020, and ironically, because of 20Twenty. After Pakistan’s frustrating loss against Australia today, batsman Mohammad Yousuf warns that Twenty20 cricket will ruin Pakistan’s game. He says:
“Because of Twenty20 cricket no player knows how to stay at the wicket anymore. Until players do not play with discipline and play ball to ball and leave balls they are supposed to we will struggle in ODIs, let alone Tests. If you are going to slog all the time what is the point? It is necessary that Pakistanis, the media, the board, the fans realise that we play as little Twenty20 as possible.”
Mohammad Yousuf is asking everyone to limit Twenty20 cricket at a time when it’s popularity is on the rise, Pakistan is the reigning World Champion and undoubtedly has the best players the game has seen (Afridi, Razzaq, Ajmal, Gul). He’s basically making a case for conservative cricket: or getting back to the basics of Test.
In Test’s even if you’re pitched a full toss at above average speed and there’s no one at long on or square leg, the skilled batsman refrains from smashing it out of the park.
Reason being the risk of getting out supersedes the worth of a six. However, that kind of discipline is the exact antithesis of 20Twenty cricket where you are required to play each ball as if it’s a potential six. But having the sense to resist potential sixers is but one part of the batting discipline needed in traditional cricket. It’s an overall psychological discipline where batsman must with extreme patience and consistency just hold one’s wicket. To do that, over after over for 5 days, knowing that the match could wind up in just a draw requires an extreme endurance that few batsman posses. In fact some of the best batsmen in the game who have mastered this don’t even play ODI’s anymore, like Rahul Dravid. Case in point, most teams don’t have players who specialize in Test, Dravid is actually a rare case. Mohammad Yousuf could then be on the right track: are players losing an edge in Test, and perhaps even skill by playing 20Twenty cricket?
20Twenty is the American equivalent of Home Run Derby: the game simply requires batsman to smash anything and everything out of the park. 8th man down must carry at least a 100% strike rate to give a team the depth required to be competitive in the game.
It’s less about psychological discipline, discerning batting or even batting skills for that matter. Because if the aim is to slog, you can take a whack at just about anything pitched your way. It requires a lot of power and little else. Anyone with training and enough arm strength to smack the ball around can be fairly successful. There aren’t rewards for consistency, patience or discipline. In fact, those qualities are counter productive in 20Twenty. In Tests you score runs by first discerning which balls are safe, whether that be after 5 or 50 overs, and then you nudge, or direct the ball into anticipated gaps.
It’s a whole different ball game, as they say in the States. So is Mohammad Yousuf correct in calling for a limit to 20Twenty? The conventional part of me who tends to resist change says yes. But the more spontaneous, forward thinking side of me says, hey, if that’s the natural progression of the game and Tests are inevitably obsolete, bring on a few more Shahid Afridi’s !
The War on Terror has most definitely shifted: terrorists are massacring Pakistani’s.
I churn each time I hear of terrorist attacks since 9/11, and mostly since then, those attacks have been on Pakistan. This weeks suicide bombings on religious processions in Karachi during the month of Mahurrum, (a somber time of reflection, considered sacred for many Muslims) are particularly unnerving.
I’ve lived in Karachi and was there until 2001: suicide bombings were unheard of before 9/11 and even though Karachi is a relatively chaotic city, never has it been victim to such consistent horror. In my lifetime, Pakistan has never suffered such widespread violence and insecurity. I’ve already written about the deteriorating state of affairs post 9/11, so today i’ll share a links to a BBC slideshow and article capturing the recent atrocities :
When the Economist, pundits and politicians declare Pakistan the most dangerous place in the world, important to remember is that it really is the most dangerous place: for Pakistanis.
Because the inherent problem with referring to any of those issues as “meddling” is that they all require the compliance of Pakistans government. Without the concession of Pakistani politicians, American interventions, assistance or policies could not be implemented.
Of course one might suggest realist theories on international relations wherein leaders, and ultimately states are subject to an international system actually dictate policymaking. In the case of current U.S. Pakistani relations some say cooperation, at any cost, is inevitable given American hegemony. It’s an argument echoing former President Musharraff’s description of why Pakistan didn’t remain neutral post 9/11:
‘Be prepared to be bombed. Be prepared to go back to the Stone Age’,” is the threat Musharraf said Pakistan received if it didn’t cooperate in Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001’s invasion of Afghanistan.
So why wasn’t neutrality an option? One might look back in history and cite an unremitting reliance on international assistance as the main cause of why Pakistani politics might seem inevitably subject to foreign interference.
During the Cold War, while countries like India declared themselves Non Aligned, Pakistan bandwagoned with the United States forming an alliance in desire to expand militarily. I won’t argue whether that military expansion was necessary or not, because there are fair arguments on either side. But military cooperation during the Cold War, and then the Soviet Afghan War set the stage for inevitable cooperation in today’s War on Terror.
Never forming viable democratic social and political infrastructure from the ground up may have fated Pakistan to rely on foreign assistance, or what some consider “meddling” for the sake of basic security and development.
The author is then correct to some extent: before whining about foreign interferences, Pakistan might consider constructing it’s own security first.
If you could spend a day chatting with anyone from history who would you pick? This question came up over dinner with friends on Saturday night. John Lennon, Socrates, Buddha, Michael Jackson, Jesus, Oscar Wilde, the Prophet Mohammad, Cleopatra and Einstein were some of the names that came up.
We stopped at Einstein and got to thinking: In helping prompt the invention of a nuclear bomb, is Einstein worthy of the historical acclaim he receives? Soon into discussion, we realized that the question itself relies on the assumption that the nuclear bomb is capable of nothing more than destruction. Which led us to thinking of deterrence.
Has the invention of the atomic bomb perhaps prevented more conflicts, therefore saving more lives than it has taken?
Deterrence theory suggests that when two countries obtain the nuclear bomb, the consequential risks of using them become so high, that the likelihood of usage decreases. Meaning the monumental destruction that would result from using an atomic bomb on another country also equipped with the bomb who would retaliate and cause similar monumental destruction outweigh interests to ever use the bomb. Another way to put it is that if two countries have the bomb, they are less likely to use it because Mutual Destruction would take place.
Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) is a military strategy related to deterrence that suggests states equipped with enough nuclear armaments to annihilate one another become less likely to use nuclear bombs because it would ultimately destroy ones own state. Thus, proponents of deterrence assert a nuclear capacity actually decreases the likelihood of conflict.
It can sound dicey and common criticisms of the idea question what happens if a government is headed by a fanatical, or irrational leader with no rational regard for consequences or fear of mutually assured destruction. Another criticism relates to the arms race that ensues when two countries spend billions of dollars amassing arms, increasing deficits and applying resources away from the daily needs of citizens over long periods of time.
But deterrence was effective for decades during the Cold War. The United States and former U.S.S.R., engaged in a massive arms race equipping themselves with enough nuclear power to completely destroy one another and proxy wars were fought, but direct combat and nuclear war were avoided.
South Asia might be another example. India and Pakistan have fought three wars since Partition in 1947, and despite perpetually volatile (mostly hostile) relations, war has been avoided since both countries tested their nuclear bombs (Kargil being a conflict, not a full scale war).
So can deterrence work today in the case of Iran? There’s an article in the Economist this week underscoring the first task which is ascertaining the motive for Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Are they after a bomb, or nuclear technology for civilian purposes? Either way, President Obama keeps “all options” on the table for future dealings. That’s diplomatic speak for, “the United States will use force if necessary”. And that itself could be why Iran is seeking the bomb.
Would a bomb bring decreased chance of conflict because states would think twice before using “all options”? Might it coerce Iran and other states to work things out diplomatically given escalated risks involved in conflict with a nuclear power?
I don’t know whether deterrence would apply in the case of Iran and am vehemently opposed to nuclear proliferation. Plus, considering the changing face of warfare given an age of terrorism, non-proliferation should be a primary, international aim. But the deterrent angle is rarely considered in discourse on Iran and I think scholars and policymakers should delve into why or why not the theory would apply to Iran’s nuclear ambitions.
One difference between valuable information and balderdash is that the balderdash is sometimes louder than the valuable information. Case in point are two articles criticizing our dealings with Pakistan. The first article offers valuable insight on why it’s imperative we revamp foreign policy to the country since it’s likely becoming the “most dangerous place in the world”. The article outlines offers 5 well- founded reasons for this and is authored by Dr. Larry Goodson of the U.S. Army World college and published by the Strategic Studies Institute. The other article is written in the online magazine Slate.com by Chris Hitchens author of God is not Great: how Religion Poisons Everything. His piece entitled “Why does Pakistan hate the United States” like Dr. Goodman’s, criticizes our foreign policy but inaccurately attributes Anti-Americanism to a sliver of Pakistani elites who irrationally and diametrically oppose the United States. Let’s compare both assessments:
“Pakistani elite hates the United States because “it is dependent on it and is still being bought by it. It is a dislike that is also a form of self-hatred of the sort that often develops between client states and their paymasters. (You can often sense the same resentment in the Egyptian establishment, and sometimes among Israeli right-wingers, as well.) By way of overcompensation for their abject status as recipients of the American dole, such groups often make a big deal of flourishing their few remaining rags of pride. The safest outlet for this in the Pakistani case is an official culture that makes pious noises about Islamic solidarity while keeping the other hand extended for the next subsidy.This is, and always was, a sick relationship, and it is now becoming dangerously diseased. It’s not possible to found a working, trusting, fighting alliance”
“The United States is Pakistan’s far away, fair weather friend, locked in a decades long transactional relationship that satisfied neither partners desires. Pakistan is the dark side of the moon to the average American who cannot tell you one salient fact about the country, its people, their customs or history. So we use Pakistan as a bulwark against whatever goes boo in the night in that part of the world, paying their price of the moment and then walking away when the crisis is resolved”
Both authors describe what former Pakistan to United States Ambassador Maleeha Lodhi called a “transactional” relationship between the countries, but differ in their assessment of that situation. Hitchens concludes U.S. Foreign Policy is doomed for failure, ultimately insisting a complete severing of cooperation is imperative. It’s a wild recommendation that assumes various security, and economic interests can just be overlooked. His suggestions are simplistic and recommendations reckless. Severing ties with a long-standing, highly strategic ally like Pakistan is absurd. Balancing relations in South Asia is in our interest and requires maintaining an alliance with both Inda and Pakistan, not one for the other. In fact, Hitchen’s doesn’t even address the crux of the issue :U.S. Foreign Policy is problematic in that it’s viewed as merely “transactional”. Instead, he jumps to an implausible conclusion that cooperation is doomed for failure.
To contrast, Goodman suggests understanding Pakistan’s complex demographic, history and then engaging them for the long haul, especially with the Chinese sitting in Pakistan’s backyard eager to replace an American absence. His piece addresses such ground realities and offers a plausible prescription for change in what’s increasingly seen as “transactional ties”.
So although Hitchens is loud and published mainstream, he’s unfortunately inaccurate. Dr. Goodson’s work is more obscure, but it’s pragmatic with a well spelled out assessment and recommendation. his article concludes with detailed recommendations for long term engagement for development in Pakistan while Hitchens outlook puts a damper on an already dire Af-Pak situation.
Presenting problems isn’t enough. Elucidating complex situations, offering accurate insights and practical solutions separate valuable information, from journalistic balderdash. Kudos to Dr. Goodson for a well written assessment of U.S. Foreign Policy to Pakistan.
Reason We Should Remain Neutral -Quite simply: “After two terms as prime minister, he’s remembered for rampant corruption, nuclear proliferation, and his penchant for cozying up to Islamist militants“
Pervez Musharraf or Asif Zardari:
Reason We Should Remain Neutral -Well: “at the behest of Washington, General Pervez Musharraf, who was president at the time, arranged the amnesty that allowed Zardari and his wife, Benazir Bhutto, to return from exile so she could lead her Pakistan Peoples Party in elections. Bhutto was assassinated, and her husband became prime minister. Not without reason, many Pakistanis who are angry about Zardari’s corruption and ineffectiveness hold the United States responsible for imposing him on their country”
Pakistan Military:
Reason We Should Remain Neutral -Perpetuating rampant blame that one too many American backed military dictators have prevented democracy from ever taking root in Pakistan can’t help growing weariness of cooperation with our government.
Noteworthy example -Backing General Zia-ul-Haq in the 1980’s with his leadership key to training the Mujahideen (now known as Al Qaeda) to oust the Soviets from Afghanistan. Not coincidentally, Zia’s regime is remembered as the time Pakistan shifted from being a socially progressive, and moderate Islamic state, to imposing severe, fundamentalist religious policy reforms.
Chief Justice Iftekhar Chaudhry:
Reason We Should Remain Neutral: Under a sugar-coated banner of “democracy”, the Chief Justice is too blatantly partisan for us to support. His recent decision to repeal the National Reconciliation Ordinance, which set wheels in motion for regime change is widely understood as nothing short of a ploy for power and done in the politics of retribution.
This leaves neutrality as not only our most wise option, but also perhaps our most ethical route. Restraint in supporting any particular regime could mean history points one less finger in our direction should anything go less than perfect as we deepen involvement in Af-Pak. Simultaneously, neutrality assures Pakistani masses who are increasingly skeptical of cooperation with the United States that they have 100% autonomy in political processes.
Well publicized neutrality on a looming regime change could be a valuable opportunity to demonstrate a genuine interest in Pakistan as they transform politically and we require their support in the War on Terror.
Most Unexpected Event: Terrorists turning domestic. Pakistan has suffered the brunt of terrorist activity in 2009. The stereotype we have of terrorists today entails violent attacks on supposed “infidels”, or western international targets. But 2009 saw Al Qaeda gradually in cooperation with the Taliban, extend violent attacks on Pakistan’s predominantly Muslim population. Attacks on and around Islamic houses of worship even became a reality this year.
What to Watch for in 2010: Increasing democratization of Pakistan, despite a very likely change in regime. Former military General Musharraf may return in some capacity, and democratization should continue to progress by way of an expanding private media. As per Musharraff’s reform in 2002, privatized Television channels have made extraordinary strides in disseminating information that is increasingly reflective of the masses, giving Pakistani’s a voice, and vehicle for change. Many consider the reinstatement of Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry in March 2009 a direct result of privatized media who vociferously helped mobilize demonstrations such as the Long March. So, although security issues will continue to dominate until Af-Pak is stabilized, expect expanding television media that can help pave the way for a more moderate, democratic Pakistan.
It’s untimely politicking in Pakistan as the Supreme Court turned overturned the National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO) that offered government officials Amnesty from corruption charges. Deeming the NRO unconstitutional today renders President Zardari the main target of reopening corruption cases against what will be thousands of top government officials including interior Minister Rehman Malik. Originally, the ordinance was put in effect in 2007 under Pervez Musharraf’s regime and intended to free Benazir Bhutto of corruption charges so that she could return and run for political office in Pakistan wherein power would likely have been shared with Pervez Musharraf after elections. The tragic death of Ms. Bhutto upset such endeavors, but ushered in Bhutto’s husband, Asif Ali Zardari as the popular victor of elections that year.
Ironically, the National Reconciliation Ordinance that helped usher Zardari to power, might now signal his exit.
As head of state, he could cite Presidential immunity from corruption charges but the ruling still riles an increasingly discontented populace against Mr. Zardari. And however noble reopening corruption cases might seem, to a discerning eye, the Supreme Court is politicking with the overturning of NRO. The Foreign Policy Magazine astutely notes that this ruling is nothing short of an “opportunity to settle a long-standing political score with Zardari“. Plus it comes conveniently at a time when the air is ripe for a new regime, some say imminent even.
The Supreme Court eyes an opportunity to not only settle a political score, but sees an chance to construct obstacles for General Musharraff who some say eyes a very possible return as Zardari’s popularity wanes.
Having sacked the judiciary during his tenure, Mr. Musharraf is not favored for return amongst the Supreme Court, to put it lightly. So, unfortunately, justice itself might not be the main ambition in overturning NRO and reopening thousands of corruption cases at this time.
Pakistan is at a crossroads: stability and development should be of top priority. There’s no room for personal power politics between parties, and branches of government which ideally would not affect policymaking, and currently should at the least take a backseat to security issues.
Mis-focus of priorities and exploiting opportunities for political retaliation is a dishonorable excuse for governance and I hope that if political transitions transpire as a result of this ruling, they will have no adverse effect on security during such testing times in Pakistan.
Friday morning a CNN headline informed us that the stock market is inching forward, but America is “still in the red”, simply reminding us that we’re spending more than we’re making.
Ouch. With an expanding war and expanding government (Af-Pak war and healthcare reform respectively), expenses seem excessive. But, thinking about the Af-Pak quagmire within this perspective made me realize the costly necessity of our engagement. Because even though it may seem cost effective and immediately convenient to bring troops home , our absence in the Af-Pak region entails risks that are perhaps higher than the costs of Obama’s troop surge, even in our downward economy.
Let’s run a counterfactual to demonstrate. If we begin troop withdrawal, ultimately winding down NATO forces as well, in the absence of a U.S. presence, Af-Pak becomes fully accessible to regional powers, including China, Russia, and India to step in. Security and development will be led by other foreign powers who emerge with powerful influence in this strategic area. Because in addition to our foremost interest in obliterating Al Qaeda, Afghanistan is strategically poised to access Central Asian energy interests as is Pakistan. Pakistan is not landlocked so the Karachi port becomes key to transporting Central Asian energy to international markets. In our absence, Russia or China emerges as forerunners in supporting Af-Pak in their route to development meaning major energy projects that we stand to benefit from, such as the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan pipeline might take a backseat to projects led by Russia. Similarly, energy projects like the Iran-Pakistan-India Pipeline which the Heritage Organization has already called “unacceptable” for U.S. interests make further headway in our absence with the support China. So withdrawing troops runs the risk of our losing access to potential energy resources and could further threaten Europe by allowing the former USSR to gain a “stranglehold over European energy security”.
Similarly, there are critical security risks that come along with our withdrawal. In our absence, regional powers that are historically not geopolitically neutral in the can create a climate of further conflict.
- Current Afghanistan-India alliance (rapidly increasing)
- Russia-Pakistan enmity (as per India Russia alliance)
- Russia-Afghanistan enmity (Soviet Afghan War)
- India-Russia alliance (An expanding, long term alliance began during the Cold War)
- India-China enmity (Sino Indian War)
- Pakistan-China alliance (Long term alliance began during the Sino Indian War)
- India-Pakistan enmity (Deep mistrust dating back to Partition in 1947 with 3 wars fought since)
This complex mix of regional relations in tandem with competing interests for Afghanistan and Pakistan creates weighty risks that are too big to take. For instance, there’s a widespread notion that Pakistan sought to wield control over Afghanistan to use it as a buffer against India and currently, the Pakistani government says the same is true for India as relations warm between Delhi and Kabul. By removing the United States from the picture, the risk of leaving two nuclear armed, historic adversaries vying for geopolitically strategic and energy rich Afghanistan becomes a weighty concern.
So two weeks ago when Fareed Zakaria questioned Prime Minister Manmohan Singh on whether or not India believes Pakistan is doing it all it can to uproot terrorism, and Mr. Singh gently responded that America has given him all the assurance he needs, one realizes the magnanimity of our mitigating tensions in the region. Leaving the Af-Pak region now runs great potential for further insecurity and could run directly counter to our energy interests. Let’s hope our policies in uprooting terror are accompanied by development strategies for long term stability in Afghanistan and Pakistan so that our presence is not perpetually required.
NYTIMES does a good job of publishing weekly articles on the Af-Pak situation. And a recent piece had a very enticing title: “The Demons that Haunt Pakistan” . It conjured deep curiosity and I delved into it anticipating the “demons” referred to how terrorists have paralyzed the country since 9/11.
Instead, the writer interviews one oddball Psychiatrist who says the “Gucci suit” wearing Americans are the real terrorists and Blackwater is luring his hired help to engage in a grand U.S. conspiracy to destroy Pakistan. Based on this sole, very erratic viewpoint, she presumes that like a “teenager” Pakistan is “self-conscious, emotional, quick to blame others for its troubles” and is where conspiracy theories are “pervasive”.But the presumption that Anti-Americanism supersedes resentment of actual terrorists who have is not well founded. In fact, only at the end of the article does she acknowledge the moderate Pakistani viewpoint:
“Islam treats foreigners according to their wishes,” It’s not what these people (terrorists) say — killing them or asking others to terrorize them,” he said contemptuously of the militants. “We must treat everybody equally. Christians, Jews, Muslims”
The author refers to this as the “unlikely exception”, but on the contrary, this perspective is more likely to be found in Pakistan. The gentleman expressing this view is working class and the masses are working class. They’re not doctors or professionals whom the author erroneously cites as the norm. Further, it’s the working classes who struggle most with terrorism, not the sliver of Pakistan’s elite population who maintain comforts despite political upheaval. So the implication that demon-esque Anti Americanism is rooted in spectacular conspiracy theories is unlikely:
The majority masses are far more skeptical of Pakistani policymakers and domestic corruption than of Blackwater and the American, or Indian government for that matter.
More accurately on India, the author cites counter productive policies in Pakistan that maintained, rather than obliterated the feudal system and attributes the profound struggles of Partition to subsequent skepticism that has been harbored by both countries for one another since. Plus, having fought three wars in just 62 years, she explains it’s “natural that Pakistan’s security concerns focus more on its eastern border with India” and “not irrational” for Pakistan to resent American calls for change in this strategy.
The piece goes on to explain resentment of American policymaking viewed as “U.S. single-mindedly pursues it’s own interests as it did in the 80’s when it was confronting the Soviets”. And therein lies skepticism for the United States in Pakistan: it’s rooted in abandoning ship post the Soviet-Afghan war. Leaving Pakistan with one of the worlds largest refugee problems well ISI/CIA trained extremist Islamist militants in a developing country hasn’t boded well 20 years later. As a partial result, Pakistan hasn’t developed, it’s deteriorated. Cooperation in our Afghan operation in the 80’s isn’t perceived as productive. Thus,
Current skepticism of U.S. expansion in the Af-Pak war is not a matter of irrational, conspiracy theories or bitterness for all things American, it comes after prolonged, and now daily struggle against extremist Islam, and terrorists who massacre Pakistanis almost daily since 9/11.
Zainab Jeewanjee