The War on Terror has most definitely shifted: terrorists are massacring Pakistani’s.
I churn each time I hear of terrorist attacks since 9/11, and mostly since then, those attacks have been on Pakistan. This weeks suicide bombings on religious processions in Karachi during the month of Mahurrum, (a somber time of reflection, considered sacred for many Muslims) are particularly unnerving.
I’ve lived in Karachi and was there until 2001: suicide bombings were unheard of before 9/11 and even though Karachi is a relatively chaotic city, never has it been victim to such consistent horror. In my lifetime, Pakistan has never suffered such widespread violence and insecurity. I’ve already written about the deteriorating state of affairs post 9/11, so today i’ll share a links to a BBC slideshow and article capturing the recent atrocities :
When the Economist, pundits and politicians declare Pakistan the most dangerous place in the world, important to remember is that it really is the most dangerous place: for Pakistanis.
NYTIMES does a good job of publishing weekly articles on the Af-Pak situation. And a recent piece had a very enticing title: “The Demons that Haunt Pakistan” . It conjured deep curiosity and I delved into it anticipating the “demons” referred to how terrorists have paralyzed the country since 9/11.
Instead, the writer interviews one oddball Psychiatrist who says the “Gucci suit” wearing Americans are the real terrorists and Blackwater is luring his hired help to engage in a grand U.S. conspiracy to destroy Pakistan. Based on this sole, very erratic viewpoint, she presumes that like a “teenager” Pakistan is “self-conscious, emotional, quick to blame others for its troubles” and is where conspiracy theories are “pervasive”.But the presumption that Anti-Americanism supersedes resentment of actual terrorists who have is not well founded. In fact, only at the end of the article does she acknowledge the moderate Pakistani viewpoint:
“Islam treats foreigners according to their wishes,” It’s not what these people (terrorists) say — killing them or asking others to terrorize them,” he said contemptuously of the militants. “We must treat everybody equally. Christians, Jews, Muslims”
The author refers to this as the “unlikely exception”, but on the contrary, this perspective is more likely to be found in Pakistan. The gentleman expressing this view is working class and the masses are working class. They’re not doctors or professionals whom the author erroneously cites as the norm. Further, it’s the working classes who struggle most with terrorism, not the sliver of Pakistan’s elite population who maintain comforts despite political upheaval. So the implication that demon-esque Anti Americanism is rooted in spectacular conspiracy theories is unlikely:
The majority masses are far more skeptical of Pakistani policymakers and domestic corruption than of Blackwater and the American, or Indian government for that matter.
More accurately on India, the author cites counter productive policies in Pakistan that maintained, rather than obliterated the feudal system and attributes the profound struggles of Partition to subsequent skepticism that has been harbored by both countries for one another since. Plus, having fought three wars in just 62 years, she explains it’s “natural that Pakistan’s security concerns focus more on its eastern border with India” and “not irrational” for Pakistan to resent American calls for change in this strategy.
The piece goes on to explain resentment of American policymaking viewed as “U.S. single-mindedly pursues it’s own interests as it did in the 80’s when it was confronting the Soviets”. And therein lies skepticism for the United States in Pakistan: it’s rooted in abandoning ship post the Soviet-Afghan war. Leaving Pakistan with one of the worlds largest refugee problems well ISI/CIA trained extremist Islamist militants in a developing country hasn’t boded well 20 years later. As a partial result, Pakistan hasn’t developed, it’s deteriorated. Cooperation in our Afghan operation in the 80’s isn’t perceived as productive. Thus,
Current skepticism of U.S. expansion in the Af-Pak war is not a matter of irrational, conspiracy theories or bitterness for all things American, it comes after prolonged, and now daily struggle against extremist Islam, and terrorists who massacre Pakistanis almost daily since 9/11.
President Obama stayed true to his word. During the presidential campaign last year, he vowed to hunt down Al Qaeda in Pakistan and after months of deliberation with Congress, his focus on deepening military involvement in the region has come to fruition. 30,000 more troops are promised to the Af-Pak war and in his speech yesterday, Obama focused squarely on the “inextricable” link Afghanistan and Pakistani security share. He insisted the “NWFP” is where terrorist leadership including 9/11 masterminds Osama bin Laden and Ayman al Zwahiri find “safe haven” and reiterated an urgency to pass the Kerry Lugar bill. But overall,
No new strategy was laid out. We’re sending more troops without any information that an improved plan is in place. With an increased focus on Pakistan knowing it has deteriorated since the War on Terror began, it is critical to see details of a more effective Af-Pak strategy.
Politicians, pundits, scholars, journalists and even bloggers like myself have called for increased intelligence sharing and military training from our end to Pakistani forces to uproot terrorists. And President Obama briefly, but finally acknowledged this would take place. However, it was said almost in passing relative to 9/11 rhetoric reminding us that we must stand in solidarity with our allies and expand our efforts in the war on terror. Which is important, however, after 8 long years of conflict and heavy taxpayer dollars allocated to this war in a downward economy, I expected at least some details of a revamped approach. Otherwise there’s a fear that more of the same will lead to more of the same: an escalation of our engagement and simultaneous worsening in the region.
There’s a very good piece in the Los Angeles Times explaining this troop surge is a replay of our approach in Iraq. The idea is that a temporary troop surge with predetermined date of withdrawal allows domestic security forces time to develop so that when our troops leave, they manage security to a large extent on their own. However, experts in the article point out that Afghanistan is vastly different from Iraq and a troop surge might not yield similar success in this case. Also, there’s little mention of Pakistan because a
troop surge would not apply to Pakistan where established military and paramilitary security forces already exist. Thus Obama’s square focus on Pakistan in tandem with a troop surge is incomplete without additional details on a revamped strategy.
And the Kerry Lugar bill is not sufficient. The fact that President Obama at the beginning of his speech still urges us to support the legislation despite widespread skepticism at home and in Pakistan, is testimony to how much a new plan is needed. Let’s hope we hear one soon.
According to Thomas Friedman in today’s NY Times, a “narrative” of Anti-Americanism thrives as terrorist organizations proactively convince the Islamic world that our intent is to oppress Muslims everywhere. He explains the narrative is a:
“cocktail of half-truths, propaganda and outright lies about America that have taken hold in the Arab-Muslim world since 9/11 and posits that America has declared war on Islam, as part of a grand “American-Crusader-Zionist conspiracy” to keep Muslims down”
There’s truth to this. Fear of the United States is on the rise in certain Muslim countries like Pakistan. A Brookings poll shows that America is more feared than India by Pakistani’s and as Bruce Riedel puts it:“anytime you outpoll India as the bad guy in Pakistan, you are in deep trouble”. But there are flaws in Friedmans idea. He says Anti-American narrative comes despite the fact that:
“U.S. foreign policy has been largely dedicated to rescuing Muslims or trying to help free them from tyranny — in Bosnia, Darfur, Kuwait, Somalia, Lebanon, Kurdistan, post-earthquake Pakistan.”
Well, U.S. foreign policy has been largely dedicated to far more than this selection of achievements. Post earthquake Pakistan takes us back only 4 years and fear of U.S. policies does not come despite assistance. It comes as a direct consequence of our orchestrating the Soviet Afghan war, outsourcing that battle to Pakistan, and leaving them with the mess of radicalized Islamic militants and one of the worlds largest refugee problems. In the same way, Friedman fails to mention American foreign policy has consistently sidestepped mediation on the Kashmir issue. And Former secretary general to the Organization of Islamic Conference, in an exclusive interview recently explained to me that both Kashmir and the Israeli-Palestinian issue are of top priority to member states.
So though it’s correct for us to refrain from direct involvement on issues beyond our interests, it’s important that our projected image is one that mitigates rather than inflames anti-Americanism. But Friedman says it’s foreign media that proactively riles Anti-Americanism amongst Muslims, not U.S. policy:
“Although most of the Muslims being killed today are being killed by jihadist suicide bombers in Pakistan, Iraq, Afghanistan and Indonesia, you’d never know it from listening to their world”
True, but there’s no homogenous “Muslim world”, not even in terms of Anti-Americanism. Pakistan is vastly distinct from the Middle East and within the Middle East itself there are enormous societal, cultural and even deep religious variations from Iran to Egypt to Indonesia.There’s no consolidated agreement on U.S. policies in Muslim countries because policies have been different in each country!
So in the same way there isn’t a homogenous notion of Christians across the globe, there isn’t one on the United States from Muslims, and there shouldn’t be one from America to a supposed “Muslim world”.
Friedman makes an error with such a sweeping generalization. Also, he uses post 9/11 as a starting point of reference for Anti American narrative. Despite countless micro instances of good will and progress that American soldiers have brought to Iraq an Afghanistan, the macro fact is, we invaded two nations in the span of 9 years, one of which was done pre-emptively.
And with no weapons of mass destruction in sight, two very large Islamic populations are skeptical of U.S. foreign policy that may have been intended to bring a better life for Muslims, but since invasion, have seen decreased security.
In fact, since our invasion of Afghanistan, not only has the targeted state deteriorated, so has neighboring Pakistan. But Friedman maintains incomplete rationale for war:
“Have no doubt: we punched a fist into the Arab/Muslim world after 9/11, partly to send a message of deterrence, but primarily to destroy two tyrannical regimes — the Taliban and the Baathists — and to work with Afghans and Iraqis to build a different kind of politics”
And it’s that tangible “punch” that people remember, not a promise for political change. Plus this kind of rhetoric leaves Muslims skeptical because there’s no mention of practical American interests that drive our policies.
With even a fair number of Americans skeptical of Bush’s reasoning to invade Iraq, Muslims who suffer the tangible consequences of our wars aren’t going to buy the idea that we invaded for solely benevolent purposes, and it’s naive for Friedman to assert that expectation.
By leaving voids in our political narrative to Muslim countries, we open a gap that dangerous Islamist groups fill with Anti-Americanism. Our intention to the Muslim world must be clear and supplanted by security in the countries we invade. With hegemony comes great responsibility. The problem of Anti-American narratives in some Muslim countries might begin with a gap in ours. We have yet to convince Muslims that our war policies, from the Soviet Afghan war, to Iraq, or Afghanistan aren’t Anti-Islamic. It’s an uphill, but necessary battle, after all, the globe is round.
At the heels of 26/11, Pakistan charged seven people involved in the Mumbai atrocities today. The Virginia Quarterly Review has a four part article revealing the ordeal in harrowing detail and after reading it, I’m still stunned. On 26/11 last year I got a call from a friend born and raised in Mumbai who was flying out there that afternoon, he said his parents were fine but his voice was wrought by a despair I hadn’t heard from him before. He didn’t specifically say he was distraught or describe how he felt in detail, but i recognized the frustration instantly because I’d heard that voice before: from friends in Karachi who witness countless threats and acts of terrorism since 9/11. I identified immediately with my friends frustration and despair on a humanitarian level, and even further because although the perpetrators in Mumbai were allegedly trained in Pakistan, I knew they’d ultimately hurt Pakistani’s the most.
As India forges ahead economically and internationally, Pakistan is deteriorating. Terrorism has brought vanishing security that has perpetually halted foreign investment, stagnating the economy leaving no trickle down for the lower and middle class majority population who simultaneously realize a widening gap in their position vis a vis the wealthy. Terrorism has rendered governance in survival mode since 9/11 making leeway for decreased oversight and increased corruption, which was rampant to begin with.
A year after the Mumbai atrocities, we see Manmohan Singh hosted at the White House in elaborate fanfare with progressive talks on bilateral trade rooted in liberalism that is fitting for a country with roughly 8% growth in GDP and a middle class that’s now larger than our entire population in the United States.
Conversely, relations with Pakistani South Asia in light of that progress are a valid point of comparison because we have a strategic interest in both countries. More than ever, it’s apparent we have economically strategic interests with India, and security based interests in Pakistan. And like previous presidencies the Obama administration quickly realized the delicate art of balancing both interests given that either country feels progressive relations with the United States inherently comes as a direct expense of one another. Engaging India as it expands economically and Pakistan geopolitically for security’s sake (i.e. in the War on Terror and in the face of an ascending China) pose an opportunity for us to strike a creative balance in South Asia.
It’s not about who wears the crown, (“Taj”) in South Asian U.S. relations, it’s about engaging both sides for the long haul.
In Pakistan that means cooperating today for security’s sake and uprooting terrorism and fundamentalism for tomorrow. Key from there is not abandoning ship, but remaining engaged so that Pakistan too has a route to economic expansion in the future. Without security, viable development won’t take place. And so long as we are engaged in an Af-Pak war, our policymakers have a responsibility to establish a roadmap that is rooted in long term success. This is our chance to get it right in South Asia, and that begins with an intention for a permanent solution. Assisting Pakistan to navigate the rising tide of development in our globalized world could be the key to ensuring they remain a strategic, long standing ally.
With Democrats weary of our engagement in the Af-Pak region becoming a Vietnam-esque quagmire, Republican’s remain hesitant to cut and run but public support is dwindling at just 40% for what Obama once said was our “war of necessity”. Apparently the “necessity” of this war is now shifted to the Pakistan front. BBC has a brief, but powerful article on how critical this war is to Pakistan by documenting thoughts of everyday citizens on the military’s recent offensive against terrorists. The piece reveals young men and women resoundingly support militarily obliterating insurgents who have spilled over from Afghanistan. But what is most pressing is the human element the article brings as we learn the unity with which each citizen describes the “fear” and “stresses” that have crept into their daily lives. Terrorism has brought a dangerous anxiety to Pakistan that didn’t exist prior to 9/11.
I was in Karachi on 9/11 and stayed for a few weeks before coming back to California. I remember President Musharraff coining the notion “Pehla Pakistan” (Pakistan First) and explaining the country would support the United States in fighting terrorism in Afghanistan because that was the right thing to do for Pakistan. But mostly I recall feeling sad, gripped: I stayed up all night on 9/11 watching footage and listening to news, not completely understanding what was happening. I was deeply saddened, yet not immediately scared. Sadness resounded minus physical fear because I was immediately safe. Pakistan was for the most part safe from terrorist activity. The Daniel Pearl incident was frightening, but it was well known that Al Qaeda had no significant presence or intent to attack within Pakistan. The BBC article today reveals a much different, severely deteriorated Pakistan.
News stories have kept me abreast of countless suicide attacks against civilians, but this particular article leaves me stunned. Again, I’m not immediately scared because I’m physically away from terrorists, but realizing that our efforts after 9/11 have not thwarted terrorists from attacking again is still saddening. Instead, terrorists continue to grip the daily lives of innocent civilians 8 years later. Secretary Clinton said “terrorism anywhere is terrorism everywhere” and that’s difficult to argue with today.
Looking beyond the fact that Pakistan is strategically poised to serve our geopolitical energy interests through Central Asia and is a good ally to have in the face of an ascending China, there’s a profound humanitarian reason to aid Pakistan in this situation.
Secretary Clinton’s remarks are reminiscent of her husbands policies. Former President Clinton’s doctrine can partially be defined as American intervention in even the most remote, far away regions for the sake of humanity which ultimately serves greater international interest (think American intervention in Bosnia). In a similar way, citizens living in constant fear beseeches us to address a perpetually devastated Afghanistan and an increasingly crippled Pakistan with a long term strategy of ensuring that terrorism is not just obliterated, but uprooted.
The difference between obliterating and uprooting terrorism is one of time. Obliterating a few thousand Taliban/Al Qaeda might be accomplished swiftly with a major Pakistan & US military offensive, through the heightened use of drones, and a stepped up counterinsurgency. But that runs a risk of tremendous collateral damage which can impoverish and ultimately isolate moderates against Pakistani and US forces. The situation is already being described as a “civil war” and a short term, merely military strategy runs the costly risk of hurting our long term plan of engaging Pakistan diplomatically (we have plans of creating massive embassies in the north). Uprooting terrorism on the other hand requires a longer term engagement because it involves ’winning hearts and minds“.
Winning hearts and minds can be achieved through sustainable economic development that tangibly alleviates pain for people in Afghanistan and Pakistan. An American hand in such development ultimately eliminates reasons for people to join terrorists who harbor anti-American ambitions.
The Kerry Lugar bill is a fair attempt at addressing this issue, but fails to realize that in Pakistan, the military has historically and relative to civilian governments, been fairly efficient at achieving development in tandem with security. So while Democrats and Republicans debate the time frame for our engagement in the Af-Pak war, I think Obama’s administration should begin a U.S. strategy from the premise of uprooting terrorism. It’s no longer just about retributive justice of ”smoking them out” as Former President Bush put it. This war is expanding internationally at the expense of innocent civilians who increasingly fear, rather than welcome American assistance . Our strategy should aim to remove terrorists for the long haul, ensuring allies like Pakistan are securely comprised 0f prosperous, welcoming citizens.
If I had a dollar for every time I had to explain the difference between a deductible and out of pocket maximum .... wait, that IS what I g… 1 week ago
Zainab B. Jeewanjee
